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Abstract
We investigate welfare and aggregate implications of a pay as you go (PAYG) social
security system in a dynastic framework in which agents have self-control problems. The
presence of these two additional factors at the same time aﬀects individuals’ intertemporal
decision problems in two opposite directions. That is, on the one hand individuals prefer
to save more because of their altruistic concerns, on the other hand, they prefer to save
less because of their urge for temptation towards current consumption. Individuals’ eﬀorts
to balance between the long-term commitment (consumption smoothing and altruism) and
the short-term urge for temptation result in self-control costs. In this environment the
existence of social security system provides not only consumption smoothing and risk-
sharing mechanisms but also a channel that reduces the severity of temptation. We ﬁnd
that the adverse welfare eﬀects of a PAYG system are further mitigated relative to the
environments that incorporates altruism and self control issues separately.
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11 Introduction
The U.S. and many other countries run a pay as you go (PAYG) social security system in
which tax revenues collected from current workers pay beneﬁts of current retirees. Because
the PAYG system aﬀects individuals’ fundamental economic decisions substantially and social
security expenses is one of the large expenditure items in a government’s budget, economists
have analyzed the eﬀects of the PAYG social security system extensively.
In the standard models of social security it is assumed that individuals save to smooth their
consumption and to insure against idiosyncratic productivity shocks and longevity risk. Yet,
individuals’ savings decisions might also be aﬀected by their altruistic concerns and self-control
problems. Although there are studies that conduct welfare analyses of a PAYG system by
using model economies that incorporate either individuals’ altruistic concerns or self-control
problems, the welfare implications of a PAYG system are not known if the two factors, altruism
and temptation, coexist. We develop a model economy that incorporates these two factors and
investigate the welfare implications of a PAYG system accordingly. In particular, we address
the following two questions. First, what are the eﬀects of temptation and altruism together on
individuals’ inter-temporal allocations and welfare? Second, what are the role and eﬀects of a
PAYG system in that environment?
The beneﬁts and costs of the PAYG system are well documented in the literature: the
PAYG system provides an insurance against longevity and income risks but, at the same time,
it distorts an individual’s saving and labour supply decisions. Using a deterministic standard
overlapping generations (OLG) model, Diamond [1965] shows that social security reduces the
steady state capital stock because it taxes workers with high propensities to save to pay beneﬁts
of retirees with low propensities to save. A decrease in a steady state capital stock, in turn,
reduces welfare when the economy is dynamically eﬃcient. Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987] assess
the magnitude of welfare losses using a deterministic large scale OLG model and ﬁnd that social
security always results in a welfare loss. Because private annuity markets that provide insurance
against longevity risk are thin, social security has an important insurance role.1 This, in turn,
creates a potential for welfare improvement. Hubbard and Judd [1987] analyze the extent of
insurance beneﬁt of social security in an incomplete market environment where individuals have
random lives. They show that even in the environment that social security provides insurance
against longevity risk, it still decreases welfare. Imrohoroglu et al. [1995] extend Hubbard and
Jude’s work by adding an individual earning uncertainty to the model through the channel of
unemployment risk. They show that social security might enhance welfare, but their results
are driven from the dynamic ineﬃciency in the model economy. To eliminate the dynamic
ineﬃciency, Imrohoroglu et al. [1999] incorporate a ﬁxed production factor, land, to a model of
social security. They show that having social security in the economy reduces welfare because
the adverse eﬀects are dominant.
Inter-generational transfers have important implications on individuals’ choices. This in
1See Diamond et al. [2005] for more information regarding with annuity markets.
2turn aﬀects the extend of the PAYG system’s costs and beneﬁts. There is a strand of the
literature that analyzes the eﬀects of social security by using dynastic models. In his seminal
work, Barro [1974] shows that if a bequest motive is operative then private transfers can
neutralize the eﬀects of public transfers and public debt i.e. Ricardian equivalence holds.
Fuster [1999] demonstrate that when individuals have bequest and inter-vivos transfer motives,
social security is less detrimental to the capital stock in an economy. Fuster et al. [2003] develop
a dynastic OLG model with inelastic labor supply. They show that the insurance role played by
social security dominates its crowding-out eﬀects on capital stock and hence, the steady state
welfare increases with social security for most households. Fuster et al. [2007] extend their
previous work by adding labor/leisure choice and ﬁnd that individuals prefer to be born into
an economy without social security mainly because of eﬃciency gains from removing distortions
on labor supply.
Potential idiosyncrasies in individuals’ preferences are another important source of uncer-
tainty regarding with the welfare implications of social security. A number of studies show
that social security can generate welfare gains when households lack the foresight to save
adequately for their retirement.2 Two types of preference structures, time-inconsistent and
self-control preferences, have been employed to analyze various macroeconomic problems in-
cluding social security.3 Imrohoroglu et al. [2003] investigate the welfare eﬀects of a PAYG
system in an economy in which individuals have time-inconsistent preferences. Social security
in that environment works as a commitment device. In other words, social security saves on be-
half of individuals who, otherwise, would not save enough for their retirement because of their
time-inconsistent preferences. Even in that environment, the existence of a PAYG program
could not improve the welfare. In a similar vein, Fehr et al. [2008] calculate the welfare eﬀects
of removing social security by calibrating a model economy to the German economy. They
calculate not only the steady state equilibrium but also the transition path. In contrast to the
results of Imrohoroglu et al., they show that social security enhances welfare and the welfare
gain is the highest if individuals have time-inconsistent preferences. Kumru and Thanopoulos
[2008] incorporate self-control preferences into a model of social security. In their environment,
social security does not play a role of a commitment device but it plays a role of a temptation
reducing device. Interestingly, Kumru and Thanopoulos show that social security might en-
hance welfare by reducing individuals’ self-control costs through the channel of reducing their
available wealth each period.
2See Imrohoroglu et al. [2003] and Kumru and Thanopoulos [2008] for a detailed discussion in this issue.
3The experimental economics literature documents that subjects who face intertemporal choice problems
often show preference reversals. The ﬁrst formal analysis of preference reversals was conducted by Strotz [1956].
Later, Laibson [1997] adopt the structure that was created by Phelps and Pollak [1968] to analyze intergen-
erational altruism to model preference reversals. Laibson modify the standard exponential discounting model
by incorporating an additional discounting factor that captures the present-bias. The new discounting factor
distorts the time-consistent feature of the standard exponential model. Laibson’s preference structure is often
called as time-inconsistent preferences. Gul and Pesendorfer [2004] attempt to explain the same phenomenon
by creating self-control preferences that depend not only on an agent’s actual consumption but also on the
agent’s hypothetical temptation consumption. ? provide empirical estimates that provide statistical evidence
supporting the presence of temptation.
3The eﬀects of a PAYG social security system on an economy in which individuals are
altruistic towards their children but have self-control problems have not yet been analyzed. In
dynastic models individuals save not only for consumption smoothing and insurance purposes
but also for altruistic motives i.e. to leave bequests and make inter-vivos transfers. Inter-
generational private transfers mitigate the adverse eﬀects of the PAYG system on savings. In
contrast, when individuals face temptation they increase their current consumptions to be rid
of the urge for temptation. Individuals’ eﬀorts to resist temptation create a self-control cost. In
such environment the PAYG system provides an additional beneﬁt: reducing self-control cost
through the channel of reducing available wealth each period. Hence, its existence might not
be as detrimental as compared to an environment in which there are no self-control problems.
In this paper we analyze the welfare implications of a PAYG social security system in a
dynastic framework in which individuals have self-control preferences. To conduct our analysis
we ﬁrst develop a simple two period model. Our simple model helps us to understand how
the interaction between altruistic concerns and urge for temptation inﬂuences the eﬀects of the
PAYG system on individuals’ saving decisions. We show that altruism and temptation factors
aﬀect individuals’ saving decisions in the opposite directions. That is on the one hand indi-
viduals prefer to save more because of their altruistic concerns, on the other hand they prefer
to save less because of their urge for temptation towards current consumption. Furthermore,
we show that altruistic individuals with self-control problems face larger self-control costs when
they are young because they save not only for their old age consumptions but also for to leave
bequests. In such environment, we show that the PAYG system oﬀer an additional beneﬁt:
reducing self-control costs. Note that the same additional beneﬁt is also available for non-
altruistic individuals when they are young. In contrast to non-altruistic individuals, altruistic
individuals face self-control costs when they are old too. Yet, the PAYG system does not oﬀer
any relief for old age self-control costs. Our simple model shows that the complex interaction
between altruistic concerns, urge for temptation, and the PAYG system has substantial impacts
on savings and self-control costs. This, in turn, raises the possibility that welfare implications
of social security might diﬀer from those already established by the previous studies, which in-
corporate altruistic concerns and self control issues separately to large scale general equilibrium
OLG models.
Next, we develop a large scale model economy that comprises altruistic individuals with
self-control preferences, competitive ﬁrms and a fully committed government. In that model,
parents and children form a decision unit called a household in which resources are pooled and
decisions are made jointly. A sequence of households in a family line, which is linked together
through skill transmission and a bequest motive, creates a household dynasty. Households
face demographic and skill shocks which are uninsurable. Our set up of household sector is
quite similar to that of Fuster et al. [2003]. However, we deviate from them by incorporating
the self-control preference structure created by Gul and Pesendorfer [2004]. We calibrate our
model to the US data. In our simulation studies we conﬁrm that the presence of two additional
factors, altruism and temptation, mitigates the adverse welfare eﬀects of a PAYG system.
4The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a concise introduction to self-control
preferences and time inconsistency. We brieﬂy present and compare the two theories and
attempt to shed light on the diﬀerent implications they have for the question at hand. Section
3 presents our two-period partial equilibrium model and analytical results. In section 4 we
present our large scale model economy, describe the parameter values of it, present results of our
policy experiments, and conduct sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes. The mathematical
details of the solution to the simple model are delegated to Appendix A. Appendix B explains
the computational techniques used in the paper and appendix C presents the remaining tables.
2 Temptation and self-control preferences
In this section we brieﬂy highlight the similarities and diﬀerences between the time-inconsistent
and the self-control preferences as well as motivate the use of the former in this paper.
2.1 Time inconsistent preferences
In the standard OLG models, preferences are deﬁned over sequences of lifetime consumption,
{c1,c2,...,cj,...,cJ}. If individuals in the economy have time consistent preferences, and a
deterministic life-span is equal to J, the utility ranking of the lifetime consumption sequences
will not depend on their standpoint j : ranking of these sequences will be invariant with respect
to the time the ranking took place.
The essence of the time inconsistent preferences is that the aforementioned invariance result
no longer holds: The discounting structure sets up a conﬂict between today’s preferences and
the preferences that will be held in the future, commonly labeled as a “preference reversal.”
For example, from today’s perspective, the discount rate between two far-oﬀ periods, j and
j + 1, is the long-term low discount rate, while from the time j perspective, the discount rate
between j and j+1 is the short-term high discount rate. This can be modeled by the following









When 0 < δ < 1 , the above discounting structure can mimic the qualitative property of the
generalized hyperbolic discounting function (namely a function implying discount rates that
decline as the discounted event moves further away in time) but at the same time maintain
most of the analytical tractability of the exponential discounting function. The preferences
given in the above equation are dynamically inconsistent, in the sense that preferences at date
j are inconsistent with preferences at date j + 1.4
4To check this note that the MRS between periods j + 1 and j + 2 consumptions from the standpoint of the
decision maker at time j is given by
u￿(cj+1)
δu￿(cj+2), which is not equal to the MRS between those same periods from
the standpoint of the decision maker at j + 1 :
u￿(cj+1)
βδu￿(cj+2)
5Note that a major consequence of the time inconsistent preferences is that the optimal
policy functions derived at age j for ages j￿ > j will no longer be optimal when the individual
arrives at age j￿; and in the absence of any commitment technology, the individual’s future
behavior will deviate from that prescribed by the earlier policy functions.
2.2 Self-control preferences
An alternative way of modelling self-control issues is to use a class of utility functions identiﬁed
by Gul and Pesendorfer [2004]. They provide a time-consistent model that addresses the
preference reversals that motivate the time inconsistency literature.
Consider a set B of consumption lotteries, and a two-period setting. Gul and Pesendorfer
[2004] have shown that under a speciﬁc assumption on choice sets (set betweenness) combined








that represents the preference relation implied by the above axioms. The function u(.) repres-
ents the individual’s ranking over alternatives when she is committed to a single choice while
when she is not committed to a single choice, her welfare is aﬀected by the temptation utility
represented by v(.). Note that when B is a singleton, the terms involving v(.) will vanish
leaving only the u(.) terms to represent preferences. However, if it is e.g. B = {c,c￿} with
u(c) > u(c￿) an individual will succumb to the temptation (that is, she will pick the commit-
ment utility-reducing alternative, c￿) only if the latter provides a suﬃciently high temptation
utility v(.) and oﬀsets the fact that u(c) > u(c￿), i.e., when
u(c￿) + v(c￿) > u(c) + v(c).
In this case the individual wishes she had only c as the available alternative, since under the
presence of c￿, she cannot resist the temptation of choosing the latter.
When the above inequality is reversed, however, the individual will pick c in the second
period, albeit at a cost of v(c￿) − v(c).5 We call the latter diﬀerence the “cost of self-control.”
In terms of the setting in the present paper, in every period an individual faces a consumption-
savings problem. Each period, our individuals make a decision that yields a consumption for
5To see that, note that for B = {c,c
￿} and u(c) > u(c




(u(˜ c) + v(˜ c)) − max
˜ c∈{c,c￿}
v(˜ c) =
= u(c) + v(c) − v(c
￿)
and since by assumption v(c
￿) > v(c) this means that
U({c,c
￿}) = u(c) − [v(c
￿) − v(c)]
i.e. the utility of the choice c gets penalized by a positive number, the ”cost of self-control”. Note that in the
case v(c
￿) < v(c) i.e. when there is congruence of the utility functions as to which alternative is the best, there
is no temptation issue anymore; c is chosen at no penalty since the v(.) terms in U({c,c
￿}) cancel out.
6that period and wealth for the next. However, each period these individuals face the temptation
to consume all of their wealth, and hence, resisting to this temptation results in a self-control-
related cost.
Under standard assumptions combined with the multi-period version of “set betweenness,”
we can represent self-control preferences in a recursive form for the purposes of our J period
model which is delegated to sections 3 and 4.
The main diﬀerence between the above models is that the self control preferences do not
imply dynamic inconsistency. Preferences are perfectly consistent. Moreover, it allows agents to
exercise self-control, an option not existing in the time-inconsistent preferences. The diﬀerence
in discounting was the source of preference reversals in the time-inconsistent preferences and the
explanation of why individuals ﬁnd immediate rewards tempting. Instead, Gul and Pesendorfer
[2004]’s explanation assumes that agents maximize a utility function that is a “compromise”
between the standard utility (or “commitment” utility) and a “temptation” utility.
Imrohoroglu et al. [2003] consider a setting similar to ours and analyze the consequences
of time inconsistent preferences, while we follow the self-control paradigm in a similar ﬁnite-
horizon setting. Gul and Pesendorfer [2004] show that for ﬁnite decision problems a time
inconsistency model can be re-interpreted as a temptation model.
3 A simple two-period model
In this section we analyze the eﬀects of altruism and self-control problems on individuals’
allocation of resources by using a two period OLG model.
3.1 Individual’s problem
An individual lives for two periods. At the beginning of her life she receives a bequest from her
parents. While she supplies her 1 unit of labor endowment inelastically when she is young, she
retires and receives a pension beneﬁt when she is old. Because of her altruistic concerns, she
saves a fraction of her wealth for her children in the second period. We also assume that she




{u(c1,s1) + v(c1,s1)} − max
￿ c1,￿ s1
{v(￿ c1, ￿ s1)}
subject to
c1 + s1 = (1 − τ)w + b1;
￿ c1 + ￿ s1 = (1 − τ)w + b1,
where V1 is the ﬁrst period’s value function; c1 is the ﬁrst period’s commitment consumption; ￿ c1
is the ﬁrst period’s hypothetical temptation consumption; s1 is the ﬁrst period’s commitment
saving; ￿ s1 is the ﬁrst period’s hypothetical saving; b1 is the bequest received from the parents;
7w is the wage income; τ is the social security tax rate; u(.) is the momentary utility function;
v(.) is the temptation utility function. We assume that momentary and temptation utility












1−σ + κ1βV2 (s1)
￿
, where V2 is the second period’s value function; λ is the parameter
that captures the strength of temptation; and κ is the parameter that governs the nature of
temptation. When κ1 < 1, individuals are tempted towards current consumption; when κ1 > 1,
individuals are tempted towards future consumption; and when κ1 = 0, individuals are tempted
to consume all available wealth in a given period. Note that {v (c1,s1) − v(￿ c1, ￿ s1)} represents
the cost of resisting to temptation i.e. the self-control cost.
In the second period she allocates her wealth between the second period consumption and
bequest levels. The dynamic programming problem is given by
V2 (s1) = max
c2,b2





￿ c2, ￿ b2
￿￿
subject to
c2 + b2 = Rs1 + T;
￿ c2 + ￿ b2 = Rs1 + T,
where b2 is the amount of bequest left if the commitment consumption level is chosen; ￿ b2 is the
amount of bequest left when the temptation consumption level is chosen; R is the gross return
from the savings, and T is the amount of pension beneﬁt. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the






1−σ and the temptation utility













v (c2,b2) − v
￿
￿ c2, ￿ b2
￿￿
is
the self-control cost in the second period. The motive for bequest arises because individuals’
preferences display "joy-of-giving" i.e. an individual’s utility is an increasing function of the
amount of bequest left.
3.2 Optimal allocation
We use the backward induction method to solve the individual’s problem. In particular we ﬁrst
solve the individual’s second period problem then we use that solution to solve the individual’s
ﬁrst period problem. Each period’s problem is solved in two steps. To solve the individual’s




￿ c2, ￿ b2
￿
. Then, we solve the
remaining sub-problem of max
c2,b2
u(c2,b2)+v (c2,b2) by using the maximized values of hypothetical
temptation consumption and bequest obtained in the previous step. The individual’s ﬁrst
period problem is solved similarly. The details of the solution are delegated to Appendix A.
The solution to the individual’s optimization problem returns the following maximized values





























































































































































Our simple model is general enough to encompass several cases: when we set the temptation
parameter λ = 0 and the altruism parameter γ = 0, we have a standard OLG model without
temptation and altruism; when we set λ > 0 and γ = 0, we have a OLG model with temptation;
and when we set λ > 0 and γ > 0, we have a model with altruism and temptation. Similarly,
we can turn oﬀ (on) the public pension program by setting τ = 0(> 0) [and hence, T = 0(> 0)].
3.3.1 Temptation, altruism and savings
In this section we focus on analyzing the eﬀects of temptation and altruism on savings. We start
our analysis by using a standard OLG model then we extend it by incorporating self-control
problems and altruistic concerns to the model to understand how the existence of temptation
and altruism would aﬀect individuals’ inter-temporal allocations and welfare. To isolate the
eﬀects of temptation and altruism we close down the public pension program.
In the standard OLG model, individuals allocate consumptions over life-cycle to maximize
their life-time utility i.e. they keep a fraction of their initial endowment for old age consumption.
The unit cost of consumption in the ﬁst period is the inverse market interest rate, 1
R. The










Yet, when a non-altruistic individual has a self control problem i.e. λ > 0 and γ = 0, the




















1 , we conclude that individuals save less when they
have self-control problems.
Proposition 1 Individuals with urge for temptation towards current consumption save less
when they are young.
The intuition is as follows. Individuals try to balance their urge for high level consumption
in a given period with the long term interest of resisting to it. Because the resistance to
temptation comes with a cost (self-control cost), the optimal level of saving is lower than the
case that there are no self-control issues.
We now introduce altruistic concerns to the model by assuming that individuals have "joy
of giving" i.e. γ > 0. It is well established in the literature that altruistic individuals save more
to leave bequests and make inter-vivos transfers. This result still holds even when individuals
have self-control problems.
Proposition 2 Altruistic individuals save more even if they have self-control problems.




































. The variable ψ captures the
eﬀect of the interaction between altruism and temptation parameters on savings. Let consider
the special case in which σ = 1 that results in ψ = (1 + γ) > 1. By plugging this value of ψ into




1 . It implies that
altruistic individuals save more because they save not only for old age consumption but also
save for to leave bequests. The similar result holds when σ > 1. In other words, the presence
of altruism mitigates the negative eﬀect of temptation on savings.
This result also reveals that temptation and altruism factors aﬀect individuals’ saving de-
cisions in the opposite directions: while the existence of temptation negatively aﬀects individu-
als’ savings, the existence of altruism positively aﬀect individuals’ savings.
103.3.2 Temptation, altruism and self-control cost
Proposition 3 Non-altruistic individuals with self-control problems face self-control costs only
when they are young.
A non-altruistic individual’s temptation and commitment consumption levels in the ﬁrst







respectively. Hence, the self-control cost of





















    

< 0.
Non-altruistic individuals do not face self-control costs when they are old i.e. SCC
(λ>0 and γ=0)
2 =
0. The reason is simple. They have only one choice when they are old: consuming everything
available. In other words, their temptation and commitment consumption levels are identical
in the second period.
Proposition 4 Altruistic individuals face self-control costs not only when they are young but
also when they are old. In addition, self-control costs they face when they are young are larger.
In the second period, altruistic individuals need to split their wealth between consumption
and bequest. To leave a bequest they should resist to the temptation that creates a self-control
cost as in the ﬁrst period. Although the presence of altruism mitigates the negative eﬀects of






























Moreover altruistic concerns result in higher self-control cost in the ﬁrst period. When
λ > 0 and γ > 0, the self-control cost SCC
(λ>0 and γ>0)































1 < 0, we conclude that the self-control cost is larger
for young altruistic individuals. The reason is as follows. In the altruistic framework individuals
tend to save more when they are young to leave bequests. This means that the gap between
11commitment and temptation consumption levels widens. As a result, altruistic individuals face
larger self-control cost in the ﬁrst period. In other words, the more "joy of giving" individuals
have the more self-control cost they face.
Corollary 1 Leaving bequest is costly for altruistic individuals who have self-control problems.
3.3.3 Social security, savings and self-control costs
An introduction of a PAYG social security system creates distortions on individuals’ inter-



















































 captures the direct eﬀect of social security on savings. In other
































captures the distortion of the tax-ﬁnancing instrument on income.
Proposition 5 The presence of altruism mitigates the adverse eﬀect of social security on sav-
ing.
The strength of the crowding-out eﬀect of social security on savings is diminished in the dyn-
astic framework. When individuals are not altruistic i.e. γ = 0, the adverse eﬀect of social secur-














































we conclude that the adverse eﬀect of social security on saving is much smaller when individuals
are altruistic.
Next, we analyze the eﬀects of social security on the level of consumption and the self-control
cost. To isolate the eﬀects of the PAYG on the self-control cost, we assume that social security
beneﬁt payments are fair: individuals receive back their contributions plus interest income i.e.







σ (w + b1)
and SCC1 = λ





















     

respectively.
12Proposition 6 The introduction of social security program reduces the self-control cost in the
ﬁrst period in both altruistic and non-altruistic frameworks.
Social security works as a forced saving mechanism in our model by assumption. It im-
plies that while social security aﬀects savings, it does not distort individuals’ inter-temporal
consumption allocations. In other words, consumption allocations remain identical before and
after the introduction of the program. However, if individuals have self-control problems, so-
cial security can still create an additional beneﬁt. It restrains young individuals’ choice sets
by reducing their available wealth through taxation. As a result, the young individuals’ urges
for temptation become less severe. This, in turn implies that the individuals face smaller
self-control costs. Note that self-control costs become smaller as the tax rate τ increases.
Proposition 7 Social security does not reduce old individuals’ self-control costs in the altruistic
framework.




























An introduction of social security creates two opposite eﬀects on available wealth in the second
period. On the one hand it increases the transfer income received, on the other hand it reduces
the investment income as a result of a decrease in savings in the ﬁrst period. Since the former
eﬀect is larger than the latter eﬀect, the introduction of social security creates a larger self-








































While social security reduces the size of the choice set in the ﬁrst period, it extend the size of
the choice set in the second period. Therefore, it reduces the self-control cost when individuals
are young and increases it when individuals are old.
Corollary 2 The presence of altruism reduces the strength of the additional beneﬁt oﬀered by
the PAYG system to individuals with self-control problems.
4 Quantitative analysis
In the previous section our partial equilibrium model was simple enough to obtain a close
form solution. Hence, we were able to draw intuitive conclusions regarding the eﬀects of
13altruism, temptation, and social security on individuals’ choices. However, our analytical results
do not encompass the general equilibrium eﬀects. We know that a change in inter-temporal
allocations ultimately aﬀects capital accumulation and market prices. These in turn create
feedback eﬀects on individuals’ resource allocations. These feedback eﬀects can have very
important implications for the policy analysis at hand as shown in the previous literature. In
addition, since the eﬀects of social security might vary across diﬀerent income groups, it is
important to model the heterogeneity among households. In this section, we develop a large
scale OLG model with heterogeneous individuals to fully analyze the eﬀects of social security.
4.1 Model
4.1.1 Demographics
We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations. Every period t a generation
of economically active individuals is born. All newly-born individuals are endowed with a skill
level s that might be high (H) or low (L). Individuals face stochastic lives and live maximum
2J periods. Following Fuster et al. [2003], we assume that individuals’ skill types aﬀect their
survival probabilities. A type s individual’s probability of surviving up to age j conditional
on surviving up to age j − 1 is given by vj(s). The constant cohort share of generation j




j = 2,3,...,2J,where λ(s) is the measure of period 1 individuals and n is the constant population
growth rate. Similarly, the cohort size of individuals dying each period (conditional on survival
up to the previous period) can be deﬁned recursively as ηj (s) =
1−vj(s)
1+n µj−1 (s).
4.1.2 Altruism and household dynasty
Individuals are assumed to be altruistic towards both their children and parents i.e. they value
their children and parents’ consumption stream. In other words, the two-sided altruism exists in
our model economy. There are three possible transfer schemes from parents to children: inter-
vivos transfers (parents are alive when they make transfers), bequests (transfer realizes when
parents die at the maximum age), and unintended bequests (transfer realizes when parents die
early). Similarly, children can transfer wealth to their parents to promote well-being of them.
An individual’s life consists of two stages. The ﬁrst stage of life, childhood, starts at age
1 and ends at at age J. The second stage of life, adulthood, starts at age J + 1 and ends at
2J. At age J + 1, individuals’ parents die and their children are born. Variable J denotes the
number of periods that children and parents’ lives overlap i.e. individuals’ lives overlap with
those of their parents in the ﬁrst J periods and overlap with those of their own children in the
last J periods. We call individuals as children in the ﬁrst stage of life and as parents in the
second stage of life.
In each period the surviving members of a family form a decision unit called “household.”
Depending on their demographic structures, households are classiﬁed into one of three groups.
Group 1 households are made up of parents and children, group 2 households are made up of
14parents only, and group 3 households are made up of children only. If parents and children
survive together, they pool resources and solve a joint utility maximization problem. This is
the simplest way to incorporate two-sided altruism.6 If children do not survive, parents run
households on their own and the family line breaks after parents die. If parents die early,
children take over and set up children only household. At age J + 1, children themselves
become new parents and start a new household with their own children. They again pool their
resources and jointly solve a new household optimization problem.
Group 1 households last for J periods i.e. they last until parents die at age 2J. A group 1
household can become a group 2 household if children die and become a group 3 household if
parents die during J periods. However, group 2 and 3 households’ types do not change within































where gj = 1,2, or 3 and v(s)
p
J+j and v(s)k
j are survival probabilities of a parent and children,
respectively.
The sequence of households of parents, children, grandchildren etc. in a family line deﬁnes
a household dynasty. Each individual is a member of two consecutive households (or decision
making units). In other words, an individual ﬁrst sets up a household with her parents and
then she sets up a household with her oﬀ-springs. Our model shows the features of both the
inﬁnite horizon and overlapping generation frameworks. While skill transmission and two-
sided altruism introduce an inﬁnite horizon framework by generating a household dynasty that
continues forever, our assumptions that each individual faces a random ﬁnite lifetime that
overlaps with her parent and her children and a demographic shock that breaks a family line
with a certain probability introduce a life-cycle framework.
4.1.3 Skill endowment
Individuals cannot change their skill types during their life-times, but it is possible that their
children are born with diﬀerent skill levels. We suppose that skill transmission across genera-











6If we assume that parents and children maximize diﬀerent objective functions, a strategic game between
parents and children arises. Solving models that incorporate such games requires a more complicated solution
technique. Nishiyama [2002] provides more details on this.
15where sp and sk denote a parent’s and a child’s skill levels respectively and πsp,sk is the prob-
ability that the child is endowed with the skill level sk conditional on his parent’s skill level sp.
Individuals’ labor eﬃciencies depend on both their skill levels and ages. We denote age and
skill dependent eﬃciency by ej(s). There is no labor-leisure choice in our model economy i.e.
individuals inelastically supply one unit of labor each period before the compulsory retirement
age at ˆ J.
4.1.4 Government and social security
The government runs a pay as you go (PAYG) social security system. The system is self-
ﬁnancing i.e. it is ﬁnanced through payroll taxes collected from working age generations. In
our calculation of social security beneﬁts we follow Fuster et al. [2003], who use a beneﬁt
formula that mimics the current beneﬁt formula used by Social Security Administration. The


















where M denotes the economy’s average earnings, MH and ML denote the average lifetime earn-
ing of high skill and low skill individuals respectively, and Ψ denotes the average replacement
rate. The beneﬁt formula reﬂects the progressive structure of social security beneﬁts. Marginal
replacement rates are lower for individuals who have higher average life-time earnings indexed
to the productivity growth.
Total government expenditure, G is ﬁnanced by labor and capital tax revenues and conﬁs-
cated unintended bequests, b. The government runs a balanced budget. Payroll, capital, and
labor tax rates are denoted by τSS, τL, and τK respectively.
4.1.5 Technology
Output Y is produced by an aggregate technology that uses labor N and capital K. The




Output shares of capital and labor are given by α and 1−α, respectively. The exogenously
given technology level A grows at a constant rate g and capital depreciates at a constant rate
δ ∈ (0,1). Firms maximize their proﬁts by setting wage and rental rates equal to marginal
products of labor and capital respectively:













A household consists of a parent and children who pool incomes and solve a joint utility
maximization problem.7 The net wage income of a child at age j is deﬁned as
yk
j(s) = (1 − τL − τSS)ej(s)w.
While a working age parent earns wage income, a retired parent gets pension beneﬁt. The net





(1 − τL − τSS)eJ+j(s)w if J + j ≤ ˆ J,
Ps(Ms) if J + j > ˆ J.

















J+j for j = 1,...J,
(8)
where ξk
j is an index function that is equal to m = (1 + n)
J if children are alive and 0 otherwise,
while ξ
p
j is an index function equal to 1 if parents are alive and 0 otherwise. We assume that
children either survive all together or die all together. Variable aj denotes the household’s
asset holding at the beginning of age j and aj+1 is the asset holding in the next period. It is
assumed that individuals face borrowing constraints, i.e. aj ≥ 0.
Individuals in this economy have self-control preferences. We follow Gul and Pesendorfer
[2004] and DeJong and Ripoll [2007] to model those preferences. Individuals face temptation
each period and resisting to that creates a self-control cost. They try to balance their current
consumption urge with their long-term beneﬁt from not succumbing into temptation. We
represent momentary utility and temptation utility functions, and temptation consumption by
u(.), v(.), and ˇ c respectively.
A household in a dynasty starts with some initial assets in the form of bequests received from
the previous household and then chooses sequences of consumption and savings to maximize
its dynasty’s expected utility. Let Vj (Φj) be the value function of a household at j given a set
of state variable Φj. The set of state variable comprises the beginning of period asset holding,








7During the rest of the paper, we will drop time subscripts from the equations in order to minimize the
notational burden.
17The household problem can be deﬁned recursively in terms of a Bellman equation as
































subject to (8) and the borrowing constraint aj ≥ 0. The variable EVj+1 is the expected value
function, deﬁned as follows:
EVj+1 (Φj+1) =

     
     
3 ￿
g=1



































instead of (ˇ ck
j,ˇ c
p
J+j). We call this disutility as a household’s self-control
cost.
We assume that the momentary function has a standard form of u(c) = c1−γ
1−γ . The tempta-
tion function might take the following functional form: v(c) = λu(c). In this functional form
higher values of λ imply increases in the share of the temptation utility. We assume that
temptation functions are strictly increasing i.e. individuals are tempted to consume their en-
tire wealth each period.
A household’s momentary utility function (temptation utility function) is the weighted sum






























the household’s momentary utility and temptation utility functions respectively.
The household problem includes several cases. If agents do not have self-control problems
then we end up in an economy in which agents have standard in period constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) preferences. More speciﬁcally, the self-control cost drops out and the
household problem becomes the following standard household problem:















subject to the budget constraint given by the equation 8 and aj ≥ 0.Similarly, if agents are not
altruistic (θ = 0) then our model turns into a pure life-cycle model.
Households face shocks to their demographic structure each period as expressed by the
Markov switching matrix Ω(gj,gj+1). Every J period when the new household is formed a






This shock only aﬀects the newborn generation and determines the type of household that this
generation will form with their parents. The current household saving in the last period is the
intended bequest, which is divided equally among m children and becomes the initial asset of




4.1.7 Recursive competitive equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1 Given realizations of initial assets, skill levels
 
sp,sk!
, exogenous skill transition
probabilities Π, survival probabilities, and government policies
{τC,τL,τss,τK,∆G,θ}, a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a collection of value
functions {Vj (aj,Φj)}
J
j=1 with Φj =
 
sp,sk,ξp,ξk!













j=1, sequences of aggregate
stocks of physical capital and labor {K, L}, and sequences of prices {w,r} such that








solve the household maximization problem, (9).
(ii) factor prices are determined by equations (2) and (3),


































(iv) commodity markets clear









































(1 + n)(1 + g)B,
(vi) social security system is self ﬁnancing




































Ω(gj,gj+1)µj (aj,Φj), for j = 1,...,J − 1.
4.2 Calibration
In this section, we brieﬂy describe the parameter values of our model economy.
4.2.1 Demographic and labor market parameters
Economically active individuals are born at the age of 20 (model age of 1). They can live up
to the the age of 90 (model age of 14) and retire at the age of 65 (model age of 9). Each period
in our model corresponds to ﬁve years. The population growth rate n is assumed to be equal
to the average of the US population growth rate between 1931 and 2006 which corresponds,
on average, to 1.2% per year (U.S. Census Bureau [2006]). This implies that the number of
20children of an individual, m is equal to 1.52.
Labor-eﬃciency proﬁles of high- and low-skill individuals, ej(s) are calculated from the
data on college and non-college graduates’ earnings from the U.S.Census Bureau [2008]. The
values for the transition probabilities are chosen following Fuster et al. [2003] as πH,H = 0.57
and πL,L = 0.83. In our model, conditional survival probabilities depend on individuals’ skill
levels. We take conditional survival probabilities for low- and high-skill individuals from Elo
and Preston [1996], who present data for the conditional survival probabilities of college and
non-college graduate males in the US.
4.2.2 Technology
The parameters describing the production side of the economy are chosen to match the long-
run features of the US economy. We set the capital share of output to the standard value,
which is α = 0.33. The total factor productivity is chosen as A = 1. Nadiri and Prucha
[1996] report estimates of physical capital and R&D capital depreciation rates are 5.9% and
12% respectively. Following Kydland and Prescott [1982] we set the capital depreciation rate
δ equal to 6%. This implies that depreciation per period, δ∗is equal to 0.21938. Annual growth
rate of technology g is taken as 2.1%, which is the actual average growth rate of GDP per
capita taken over the time interval from 1959 to 1994 (Hugget and Ventura [1999]).
4.2.3 Government and social security
The US Social Security Administration calculates retirement beneﬁts by using a concave, piece-
wise linear beneﬁt function. There is a negative correlation between average life time earnings
and marginal replacement rates i.e. higher average lifetime earnings yield lower replacement
rates. We choose the average replacement rate, Ψ equal to 0.40 that yields a realistic approxima-
tion of beneﬁt formulas of high and low skill individuals in our economy. Government purchases
to GDP ratio (G
Y ) set equal to 0.18. The capital income tax rate τK, the consumption tax rate,
and labor income tax rate τL are set equal to 40%, 5.5%, and 20% respectively.
4.2.4 Preferences
Throughout our analysis we use a concave temptation function. Empirical studies estimate
the values of the relative risk aversion parameter γ between 1 and 10 (Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ
[1987]). We conduct our benchmark analysis by setting γ = 2 and λ = 0.0786 following
DeJong and Ripoll [2007]. The annual discount factor β is calibrated in such a way that the
capital-output ratio of the model approximates that of the US economy.
The parameters of the benchmark calibration is given in Table 1.
8δ
∗ = 1 − (1 − δ)
( years
J−1 ) = 1 − 0.94
4 = 0.2193
21Demographics
Maximum possible life span 2J 14
Obligatory retirement age Jw 9
Growth rate of population n 1.20%
Measure of individuals with high ability λ(H) 0.28
Labor eﬃciency proﬁle {ej(s)}Jw−1
j=1 U.S. Census Bureau (2008)
Conditional survival probabilities {vj(s)}2J
j=1 Elo and Preston (1996)
Production
Capital share of GDP α 0.33
Annual depreciation of capital stock δ 0.06
Annual per capita output growth rate g 2.1%






Annual discount factor of utility β 0.998
Scale factor of the temptation utility λ 0.0786
Risk aversion parameter γ 2.0
Government
Social security replacement ratio θ 0.44
Labor income tax rate τL 0.2
Capital income tax rate τK 0.4
Consumption tax rate τC 0.055
Government purchases as a percentage of GDP 18%
Table 1: Parameter values of the benchmark calibration
4.3 Results
Before starting the welfare analysis of a PAYG system in an economy with altruism and tempta-
tion we want to demonstrate the eﬀects of temptation on economic aggregates. The following
two examples are created for this purpose.9
In our ﬁrst example we want to show the eﬀects of temptation on economic aggregates
in a pure life cycle model (θ = 0).10 In order to do so, we ﬁrst calibrate a pure life cycle
model economy to the US data assuming that the time-discounting factor β = 1.0126. In this
calibration exercise, we assume that individuals have time-consistent preferences (λ = 0) and
the social security replacement rate is 40% (Ψ = 0.40). This rate is approximately equal to
the average replacement rate in the US. We hit the long-term average of the US capital output
ratio of 2.5 (see Table 2). Then we shut down the social security system (Ψ = 0) to isolate the
eﬀects of temptation better and vary values of the temptation parameter λ. As it can be seen
in Table 3, the existence of temptation and the associated self-control cost cause a substantial
reduction in the aggregate stock of capital. A comparison of of the ﬁrst two rows of Table
3 reveals that the capital stocks decreases by 3.46%. It is interesting to see that this sharp
9Unless stated otherwise the risk aversion parameter γ = 2 in all of the following computational exercises.
10In other words there is no altruism in the model economy.
22decrease is actually generated by very small value of the temptation parameter. We increase
the value of the temptation parameter by 50% starting with the parameter value of 0.025. The
initial 50% increase reduces the level of capital stock about 1.74%. For the higher values of
the temptation parameter, a 50% increase reduces the capital stock at higher rates . In other
words, when the severity of temptation increases the marginal cost of temptation in terms of a
decrease in the capital stock increases.
In our second example we use a two sided altruistic framework (θ = 1). First we calibrate
the model to the US data assuming that the time-discount factor β = 0.94937. As in the above
we assume that individuals have time-consistent preferences and the social security replacement
rate is 40%. We hit the long-term average of the US capital-output ratio (see Table 4) then
we shut down the social security system and vary the values of the temptation parameter.
These two examples allow us to compare the distortions on the aggregate capital stocks in both
altruistic and non-altruistic frameworks as a result of the existence of temptation. A quick
comparison of the ﬁrst two rows of Table 3 and Table 5 reveals that the existence of a self-
control problem at the same strength reduces the capital stock more in the altruistic framework
(while the capital stock decreases 3.46% in the pure life cycle framework, it decreases 4.70%
in the altruistic framework). Starting from the parameter value of 0.025 we increase the value
of the temptation parameter by 50%. The initial 50% increase creates a 2.22% decrease in
the aggregate capital stock. As in the ﬁrst example the marginal cost of temptation in terms
of a decrease in the capital stock increases as the severity of temptation increases. It is clear
that each 50% increase in the value of temptation parameter creates more distortions in the
altruistic framework.
Kumru and Thanopoulos [2008], in a pure life cycle framework, show that temptation
negatively aﬀects individuals’ savings decisions and hence, it reduces the overall capital stock.
In a dynastic framework in which individuals have time-consistent preferences, Fuster et al.
[2003] show that individuals save more than those in a pure life cycle framework because
of their altruistic concerns. These two studies show that temptation and altruism are two
factors that have opposite eﬀects on the aggregate capital stock. Our simple two period model
conﬁrms results of Kumru and Thanopoulos [2008] and Fuster et al. [2003]. However, it has
been unknown that how temptation and altruism factors interact and what are the eﬀects of
the interaction on the capital stock. A comparison of above two examples provide an answer to
this question: the existence of temptation severely reduces the capital stock in both altruistic
and pure life-cycle frameworks but the rate of decrease in the capital stock is larger when
individuals are altruistic. In other words, same degree of temptation reduces the capital stock
more in the dynastic framework. The mechanism that derives this result is as follows. The
existence of altruism causes a higher level of savings that results in a higher level of wealth
in each period. Yet, the higher level of wealth in each period translates into a higher level of
self-control cost for a given level of temptation. Therefore, individuals decrease their savings
more to escape from higher self control costs in the dynastic framework due to an increase in
the strength of temptation.
23Next we analyze both aggregate and welfare eﬀects of a PAYG system in economies pop-
ulated with individuals who have time-consistent and self-control preferences respectively. We
ﬁrst use a pure life cycle framework then we employ a two-sided altruistic framework.11 In all
our analysis we chose β in such a way that the capital-output ratio is about 2.5 when the social
security replacement rate Ψ = 0.40. As in Fuster et al. [2003], households diﬀer in terms of
their demographic composition and skills. According to their demographic compositions house-
holds are divided into three groups: a household is made up of both a parent and children is
called as Group 1 household and denoted by G1; a household is made up of the parent only is
called as Group 2 household and denoted by G2; a household is made up of only of children
are called as Group 3 household and denoted by G3. Since individuals diﬀer in terms of their
skill levels, a G1 type of household is divided further into four categories: LL, LH, HL, and
HH. The ﬁrst capital letter denotes the parent’s skill level (H for high skill and L for low skill)
and the second capital letter denotes children’ skill levels. G2 and G3 types of households are
divided into two more categories: H and L. For each case we create two tables. The ﬁrst table
shows the levels of capital stock, consumption, and output relative to the corresponding levels
at 0% replacement rate economy. The second table shows the welfare eﬀects of various replace-
ment rates on diﬀerent types of households. In particular, the ﬁrst column of the second table
reports the average replacement rate which varies between 0% and 100%. Each remaining
column except the last column reports the steady state expected life-time utility of households
relative to the corresponding levels at 0% replacement rate economy. The last column reports
the average of the households’ expected lifetime-utilities.
In the ﬁrst case we use a pure life cycle framework in which individuals have time consistent
preferences. This case corresponds to the standard social security models that are extensively
analyzed (see for example Imrohoroglu et al. [1995]). Our results here are consistent with
those of the previous studies. In particular, a higher social security replacement rate causes a
lower level of capital stock and a lower level of expected utility for each type of G1 households
because the PAYG system transfers resources from individuals who have high propensity to save
to individuals who have high propensity to consume (see Table 6 and Table 7). Note that the
only parent household G2 always prefers the highest social security replacement rate because
its member receives much higher social security beneﬁts than her contributions to the system
through payroll taxes. Similarly the only children household G3 always prefers the lowest social
security replacement rate because its members do not get any social security beneﬁts although
they contribute to the system through their payroll taxes. Therefore we generally do not pay
much attention to G2 and G3 types of households’ welfare.
In the second case we use a pure life cycle framework in which individuals have self-control
preferences. This case corresponds to the model analyzed by Kumru and Thanopoulos [2008]
and our results are consistent with their results. Each social security replacement rate reduces
the capital stock more because of the existence of temptation (compare Table 6 and Table 8).
11Kumru and Thanopoulos [2008] analyzed the welfare eﬀects of a PAYG social security system in a pure life
cycle economy populated with individuals who have self-control preferences. We repeat a similar analysis here
in to make the paper self-contained.
24Yet the welfare cost of having a higher social security replacement rate is not as high as in Case
1 (see Table 9). In other words, each replacement rate reduces each G1 household’s welfare less.
In Case 2, the PAYG system oﬀers an additional beneﬁt: It reduces individuals’ self-control
cost by reducing their wealth each period. As a result, the PAYG system is less detrimental to
the overall welfare.
In the third case we use a two-sided altruistic framework in which individuals have time-
consistent preferences. The model we analyze corresponds to the model analyzed by Fuster
et al. [2003]. A comparison of Table 6 and Table 10 reveals that the presence of altruism
mitigates the crowding out eﬀect of a PAYG system. Hence the steady state expected utility
of a new born household is either reduced less or increased by a higher replacement rate in
comparison to Case 1 (see Table 11).
Although in our initial examples we demonstrated that the existence of temptation in an
altruistic framework reduces the capital stock more, it has not yet been known how these two
factors together alter the welfare implications of a PAYG system. The three cases above demon-
strate that altruism and temptation are quite eﬀective to mitigate adverse welfare consequences
of higher social security replacement rates.
The fourth case is created to analyze the welfare implications of a PAYG system in a two
sided altruistic framework in which individuals have self-control preferences. This case allows
us to explore how altruism, temptation and a PAYG system interact with each other and the
eﬀects of this interaction on economic aggregates and welfare of each type of household. To
demonstrate the eﬀects of temptation better in an altruistic framework we often compare the
results in this case with those of Case 3.
Introducing social security with 40% replacement rate causes a crowding-out eﬀect in both
Case 3 and Case 4. In particular, while an economy with 0% replacement rate creates 9.29%
more capital stock and 3.45% more output in Case 3 it creates only 8.09% more capital stock
and 2.99% more output in Case 4 (see Table 10 and Table 14) We have already showed that
the existence of temptation in an altruistic framework reduces the capital stock. Because the
level of capital stock is lower in Case 4 than that of Case 3, the same replacement rate creates
less severe crowding-out eﬀect in Case 4. In other words, the marginal crowding-out eﬀect of
a replacement rate is smaller if the economy populated with individuals who have self-control
problems. As in the previous cases 0% replacement rate economy of Case 4 creates the highest
level of capital stock.
Table 11 shows that while LL, LH, and HH types Group 1 households prefer a 0%
social security replacement rate, a HL type Group 1 household prefers a 100% social security
replacement rate in Case 3.12 Imrohoroglu et al. [2003] give a number of reasons regarding
with the observed diﬀerences in preferences towards various social security replacement rates:
First, because households’ life spans diﬀer the value they assign to the annuity role of social
12Although the model we used in Case 3 is very similar to that of Fuster et al. [2003], our welfare results slightly
diﬀer. In Fuster et al. [2003] HH types prefers 80% replacement rate and LL type prefers 44% replacement rates.
However, both our results and their results imply that the average utility measure indicates 0% replacement rate
as a welfare maximizing rate.
25security diﬀers. Second, social security redistributes income from high-skill individuals to low
skill individuals through the progressive beneﬁt formula and hence, low skill individuals might
prefer higher replacement rates. Third, more borrowing constrained households might value
social security less. Not surprisingly while a Group 2 household where only a parent is alive
prefers the highest replacement rate a Group 3 household in which only children are alive
prefers the lowest replacement rate. The reason is as follows: In the former case, a household
receives much higher social security beneﬁts compared to its life-time social security payroll
tax payments and hence, the highest replacement rate is optimal for this group. In the latter
case, a household does not receive any social security beneﬁts and hence only a 0% replacement
rate maximizes its welfare.
Welfare results in Case 4 are quite interesting. On average, the negative welfare eﬀects
of social security are mitigated when individuals have self-control preferences in a dynastic
framework. However, welfare eﬀects of social security vary signiﬁcantly across diﬀerent types
of households. Households’ wealth seems to be the key factor governing those diﬀerences. In
this environment social security provides an additional beneﬁt through the channel of reducing
available wealth in each period. In other words, it plays a role of a temptation reducing device.
Demand for such a device varies across diﬀerent types of households. Richer households seems
to demand more social security to reduce their large self-control costs. HL and HH types
G1 households have relatively larger household wealth than those of LL and LH types G1
households. This, in turn implies that HL and HH types G1 households face larger self-
control costs for a given strength of temptation and hence, they have a higher demand for a
self-control reducing device. The existence of the PAYG system certainly help to meet their
demands. In particular, an increase in the generosity of social security (an increase in the social
security replacement rate) increases HL type’s expected utility more when individuals have
self-control preferences (compare tables 11 and 13). Note that both in Case 3 and Case 4, HL
types prefer 100% replacement rate as in Fuster et al. [2003] but the presence of temptation
makes the welfare gain more pronounced. Similarly, an increase in the generosity of social
security decreases HH type household’s expected utility less when individuals have self-control
preferences (see tables 11 and 13).
LL and LH types G1 households have relatively low wealth. This implies that for a given
strength of temptation these two types have lower self-control costs and hence, they have lower
demand for a self-control reducing device. Hence, the additional beneﬁt of social security
as a self-control reducing device is quite small. A comparison of tables 11 and 13 reveals
that higher replacement rates decrease LL and LH type’s expected utilities more in Case 4
when replacement rates are relatively small. Surprisingly, the presence of temptation does not
mitigate but exaggerate the adverse welfare implications of a PAYG system for poor households
for smaller replacement rates. If the replacement rates are big enough (bigger than 0.3 for LL
types and bigger than 0.4 for LH types) then the presence of temptation does mitigate the
adverse eﬀects of social security. This non-linear eﬀects are due to the structure of social
security beneﬁt function and general equilibrium eﬀects. One should note that our social
26security beneﬁt formula is more progressive towards the low-skill retired parents (namely, low-
income households).
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
We conduct a sensitivity analysis to test robustness of our results. We increase the values of
temptation parameters in the benchmark model to .1572 and to 0.2. In each experiment, we
re-calibrate the benchmark model when Ψ = 0.4 to hit our target moment. We then vary the
replacement rates and report the eﬀects on aggregate variables and welfare in tables from 14
to 17. We ﬁnd that our results are quite robust. When we increase the value of temptation
parameter, the self-control cost becomes more severe. It means that the role of social security
as a self-control cost reducing device becomes more important. Consequently, the adverse eﬀect
of PAYG system on welfare is mitigated further.
5 Conclusion
We study the eﬀects of the PAYG social security in an environment where agents are altruistic
and have self-control problems. We ﬁrst conduct our analytical analysis in a simple partial
equilibrium OLG model. Next, we extend to a large scale general equilibrium OLG model
with altruistic individuals. We calibrate our large OLG model to the US data to conduct
quantitative analysis. We ﬁnd that the presence of altruism mitigates the adverse eﬀects of
temptation on savings but magniﬁes the severity of temptation and the self-control costs. In
such an environment PAYG system not only provides consumption smoothing and risk-sharing
but also provides an additional beneﬁt: a channel that reduces the severity of temptation.
Therefore, the adverse welfare eﬀects of the PAYG system futher mitigated.
In short, in this paper we make two contributions to the literature. First, we develop an
analytical framework to explore how the interaction between altruism and temptation aﬀects
individuals’ inter-temporal allocations and welfare. Second, we analyze the roles and welfare
implications of a PAYG social security system when altruism and temptation are presented at
the same time.
In this analysis we focus on steady state analysis. We abstract from the short-run eﬀects of
social security reforms. In addition, we aslo assume away interaction between self-control prob-
lems and liquidity constraints. We think that these are interesting issues for future research.
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29Appendix A: Solution for the analytical model
We use the backward induction method to solve the household’s problem. In particular we ﬁrst
solve the household’s second period problem and then use that solution to solve the household’s
ﬁrst period problem. In each period we solve the problem in two steps.




￿ c2, ￿ b2
￿
to obtain
the maximized values of hypothetical temptation consumption and bequest. Then we solve the
sub-problem of max
￿ c,￿ b
{u(c,b) + v (c,b)} by using the maximized values we obtained in the ﬁrst
step. More speciﬁcally, the second period problem is given by


































c2 + b2 = Rs1 + T;
￿ c2 + ￿ b2 = Rs1 + T.















: ￿ c2 + ￿ b2 = Rs1 + T
￿
.
Then, we solve the remaining commitment sub-problem while taking the maximized value of





















: c2 + b2 = Rs1 + T
)
.
The parameter κ determines the strength of the future temptation utility. In order to make
our analysis tractable we assume agents are tempted to consume all available resources. It
implies that κ = 0. Hence, the second period maximized value of the temptation consumption
is simpliﬁed to the following:
￿ c2 = Rs1 + T.
Hence, the individual’s utility maximization problem becomes the following:












s.t. c2 + b2 = Rs1 + T.
Note that since the level of temptation utility ￿ c2 has no eﬀect on the levels of consumption c2









where p2 is the Lagrangian multiplier. The combination of these two equations yields the






























(Rs1 + T). (11)


































































































































































































































+ κβV2 (￿ s1)
￿)
We solve the individual’s problem in two steps as in the above. In the ﬁrst step we get the
following temptation consumption level:
￿ c1 = (1 − τ)w + b1.









1−σ + βV2 (s1)
s.t. c1 + s1 = (1 − τ)w + b1
￿
.










∂s1 is the marginal value function that represents the marginal utility of saving.























































































































= (1 − τ)w + b1
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where, y2 is the income available at beginning of the second period.
y2 = Rs∗


























Appendix B: Solution algorithm for quantitative model
General procedure to solve a general equilibrium problem
1. Discretize state space of asset [a0,a1,...,amax].
2. Guess initial factor prices R, w and endogenous government policy variables.
3. Solve household problem to obtain decision rules of consumption, savings and labor sup-
plies (See algorithm 3 for more details).
4. Obtain a stationary distribution across states (See algorithm 4 for more details).
5. Clear factor markets to get new factor prices and balance government budget to pin down
endogenous government variables.
6. Check a relative change in aggregate capital stocks after each iteration and stop algorithm
when the change is relatively small (10−4 percent). Otherwise, repeat step from 3 to 6.
Solving household problem to obtain decision rules
1. Guess initial value function and marginal value function of the next household in the
dynasty.
2. Use backward induction method to solve for decision rules, value function and marginal
value function of the current household from period J back to period 1.
3. Use value function and marginal value function at the ﬁrst period of the current household
to update value function and marginal value function of the next household.
4. Repeat 2 and 3 until value function converges. In other words, if a relative diﬀerence
between value functions of two consecutive iterations is relatively small, 100
￿V i+1−V i￿
￿V i￿ ≤
ε = 10−4, then stop.
34Stationary measures
1. Guess a distribution of bequests or initial asset holdings of households in period 1
(e.g. uniform distribution).
2. Iterate this distribution forward to obtain the distribution of assets from period 2 to J
given decision rules and Markov transition probabilities.
3. Use the distribution of savings in the last period J and Markov transition probability of
skill transmission to update the distribution of bequests.
4. Keep repeating steps 1 to 3 until the distribution of assets converges. In other words, if
the relative diﬀerence between the distributions of two consecutive iterations is relatively
small, for example 100
￿µi+1−µi￿
￿µi￿ < ε = 10−8, then stop.
35Appendix C: Tables
Ψ Y C K K/Y R
0.4 0.2269 0.7443 0.569 2.5075 1.059
Table 2: Agggregate variables in the economy with no altruism and no temptation
λ Y C K K/Y R
0.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 2.757 1.053
0.025 98.740 98.924 96.540 2.696 1.054
0.037 98.127 98.400 94.883 2.666 1.055
0.056 97.232 97.634 92.499 2.623 1.056
0.084 95.953 96.545 89.159 2.562 1.058
0.127 94.122 94.978 84.513 2.476 1.060
Table 3: Aggregate variables in the non-altruistic framework with diﬀerent degree of temptation
and no social security: θ = 0, Ψ = 0 and β = 1.0126
Ψ Y C K K/Y R
0.4 0.22684 0.7147 0.5674 2.5013 1.0592
Table 4: Agggregate variables in the economy with altruism but no temptation
36λ Y C K K/Y R
0.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 2.663 1.055
0.025 98.283 98.651 95.302 2.583 1.057
0.037 97.472 97.988 93.135 2.545 1.058
0.056 96.267 97.011 89.972 2.489 1.059
0.084 94.618 95.643 85.756 2.414 1.062
0.127 92.374 93.843 80.224 2.313 1.065
Table 5: Aggregate variables in the altruistic framework with social security and diﬀerent
degree of temptation: θ = 1, Ψ = 0 and β = 0.949372
ΨI Y C K K/Y R
0.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 2.757 1.053
0.100 98.537 98.929 95.990 2.686 1.054
0.200 97.188 97.944 92.384 2.621 1.056
0.300 95.943 97.039 89.132 2.561 1.058
0.400 94.803 96.223 86.223 2.508 1.059
0.500 93.766 95.468 83.627 2.459 1.060
0.600 92.754 94.748 81.144 2.412 1.062
0.700 91.797 94.070 78.840 2.368 1.063
0.800 90.888 93.429 76.691 2.326 1.064
0.900 90.036 92.831 74.709 2.288 1.065
1.000 89.237 92.274 72.882 2.252 1.067
Table 6: Aggregate eﬀects of social security in the non-altruistic framework with no temptation:
θ = 0, λ = 0 β = 1.0126
ΨI G1:L,L G1:L,H G1:H,L G1:H,H G2:L G2:H G3:L G3:H Average
0.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
0.100 99.599 98.911 99.914 99.125 107.161 104.997 96.796 96.758 99.482
0.200 99.179 97.783 99.788 98.237 113.003 109.268 93.540 93.463 98.937
0.300 98.743 96.628 99.617 97.337 117.957 112.988 90.224 90.107 98.369
0.400 98.305 95.466 99.414 96.435 122.181 116.251 86.854 86.696 97.791
0.500 97.867 94.314 99.181 95.537 125.846 119.143 83.428 83.229 97.208
0.600 97.375 93.105 98.873 94.584 129.039 121.721 79.863 79.621 96.566
0.700 96.852 91.873 98.514 93.602 131.852 124.030 76.187 75.900 95.888
0.800 96.298 90.616 98.099 92.589 134.357 126.108 72.387 72.053 95.175
0.900 95.716 89.343 97.632 91.548 136.603 128.003 68.464 68.081 94.429
1.000 95.106 88.053 97.117 90.479 138.635 129.738 64.409 63.976 93.652
Table 7: Welfare eﬀects of social security in the non-altruistic framework with no temptation:
θ = 0, λ = 0 and β = 1.0126
37ΨI Y C K K/Y R
0.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 2.746 1.053
0.100 98.502 98.895 95.893 2.674 1.055
0.200 97.148 97.907 92.276 2.609 1.056
0.300 95.886 96.987 88.987 2.549 1.058
0.400 94.748 96.146 86.082 2.495 1.059
0.500 93.637 95.367 83.308 2.443 1.061
0.600 92.620 94.644 80.819 2.396 1.062
0.700 91.652 93.958 78.495 2.352 1.063
0.800 90.737 93.310 76.336 2.310 1.065
0.900 89.866 92.698 74.319 2.271 1.066
1.000 89.044 92.124 72.447 2.234 1.067
Table 8: Aggregate eﬀects of social security in the non-altruistic framework with temptation:
θ = 0 and λ = 0.0786, and β = 1.0201
ΨI G1:L,L G1:L,H G1:H,L G1:H,H G2:L G2:H G3:L G3:H Average
0.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
0.100 99.625 98.937 99.963 99.147 107.323 105.147 96.773 96.733 99.511
0.200 99.256 97.860 99.900 98.302 113.331 109.565 93.520 93.437 99.017
0.300 98.868 96.747 99.786 97.442 118.422 113.402 90.198 90.068 98.496
0.400 98.491 95.641 99.651 96.593 122.773 116.787 86.839 86.531 97.978
0.500 98.061 94.472 99.442 95.694 126.540 119.773 83.347 82.985 97.401
0.600 97.631 93.314 99.200 94.796 129.841 122.457 79.787 79.373 96.819
0.700 97.170 92.131 98.907 93.867 132.771 124.868 76.110 75.640 96.202
0.800 96.684 90.930 98.561 92.913 135.390 127.058 72.312 71.786 95.553
0.900 96.166 89.707 98.162 91.927 137.750 129.056 68.381 67.796 94.869
1.000 95.619 88.468 97.710 90.909 139.903 130.895 64.311 63.667 94.152
Table 9: Welfare eﬀects of social security in the non-altruistic framework with temptation:θ = 0
and λ = 0.0786, and β = 1.0201
ΨI Y C K K/Y R
0.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 2.661 1.055
0.100 98.765 98.984 96.607 2.603 1.056
0.200 97.760 98.189 93.902 2.556 1.058
0.300 97.020 97.618 91.940 2.522 1.059
0.400 96.548 97.305 90.702 2.500 1.059
0.500 96.321 97.213 90.112 2.490 1.059
0.600 96.259 97.269 89.949 2.487 1.060
0.700 96.325 97.437 90.123 2.490 1.059
0.800 96.522 97.719 90.635 2.499 1.059
0.900 96.859 98.122 91.517 2.515 1.059
1.000 97.345 98.655 92.798 2.537 1.058
Table 10: Aggregate eﬀects of social security in the altruistic framework with no temptation:
θ = 1 and λ = 0, and β = .949372
38ΨI G1:L,L G1:L,H G1:H,L G1:H,H G2:L G2:H G3:L G3:H Average
0.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
0.100 99.170 98.500 99.947 99.371 105.376 103.624 97.671 97.763 99.182
0.200 98.783 97.739 99.921 98.790 109.979 106.809 95.416 95.592 98.746
0.300 98.510 97.059 99.928 98.282 114.010 109.642 93.251 93.494 98.406
0.400 98.334 96.465 99.967 97.852 117.622 112.212 91.169 91.460 98.152
0.500 98.262 95.947 100.027 97.492 120.921 114.589 89.154 89.473 97.986
0.600 98.252 95.449 100.089 97.170 123.976 116.825 87.154 87.487 97.868
0.700 98.285 94.952 100.147 96.873 126.831 118.953 85.147 85.482 97.781
0.800 98.345 94.459 100.202 96.602 129.529 121.001 83.129 83.453 97.714
0.900 98.431 93.981 100.255 96.361 132.102 122.995 81.098 81.396 97.668
1.000 98.537 93.523 100.312 96.156 134.454 124.956 79.055 79.312 97.641
Table 11: Welfare eﬀects of social security in the altruistic framework with no temptation:
θ = 1 and λ = 0, and β = .949372
Ψ Y C K K/Y R
0.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 2.639 1.056
0.100 98.820 99.016 96.757 2.584 1.057
0.200 97.912 98.293 94.306 2.542 1.058
0.300 97.303 97.841 92.686 2.514 1.059
0.400 97.006 97.664 91.903 2.500 1.059
0.500 96.894 97.648 91.610 2.495 1.059
0.600 96.946 97.794 91.745 2.497 1.059
0.700 97.148 98.080 92.276 2.507 1.059
0.800 97.446 98.445 93.065 2.520 1.059
0.900 97.868 98.932 94.190 2.540 1.058
1.000 98.404 99.514 95.631 2.565 1.057
Table 12: Aggregate eﬀects of social security in the altruistic framework with temptation: θ = 1
and λ = 0.0786, and β = .95512
Ψ G1:L,L G1:L,H G1:H,L G1:H,H G2:L G2:H G3:L G3:H Average
0.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
0.100 99.145 98.598 99.977 99.447 105.791 103.791 97.648 97.821 99.187
0.200 98.599 97.350 99.996 98.955 110.770 107.133 95.387 95.718 98.609
0.300 98.488 96.606 100.057 98.544 115.172 110.120 93.232 93.687 98.389
0.400 98.768 96.410 100.045 98.069 120.162 113.102 91.679 91.901 98.487
0.500 98.840 95.990 100.149 97.784 123.719 115.617 89.684 89.942 98.442
0.600 98.934 95.559 100.253 97.531 127.044 118.003 87.700 87.971 98.413
0.700 99.093 95.112 100.357 97.311 130.198 120.302 85.722 85.982 98.429
0.800 99.196 94.666 100.447 97.100 133.207 122.534 83.712 83.943 98.406
0.900 99.291 94.222 100.532 96.916 136.023 124.727 81.684 81.865 98.379
1.000 99.376 93.768 100.611 96.751 138.441 126.901 79.625 79.733 98.345
Table 13: Welfare eﬀects of social security in the altruistic framework with temptation: θ = 1
and λ = 0.0786, and β = .95512
39Ψ Y C K K/Y R
0.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 2.617 1.056
0.100 98.825 99.019 96.770 2.562 1.058
0.200 98.052 98.400 94.683 2.527 1.058
0.300 97.639 98.115 93.579 2.508 1.059
0.400 97.472 98.034 93.135 2.500 1.059
0.500 97.451 98.092 93.078 2.499 1.059
0.600 97.595 98.302 93.462 2.506 1.059
0.700 97.895 98.665 94.263 2.519 1.059
0.800 98.228 99.060 95.154 2.535 1.058
0.900 98.776 99.645 96.637 2.560 1.058
1.000 99.332 100.247 98.156 2.586 1.057
Table 14: Aggregate eﬀects of social security in the altruistic framework with temptation: θ = 1
and λ = 0.1572, and β = .959588
Ψ G1:L,L G1:L,H G1:H,L G1:H,H G2:L G2:H G3:L G3:H Average
0.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
0.100 98.859 98.594 99.963 99.360 105.901 103.898 97.625 97.844 98.986
0.200 98.462 96.592 100.000 98.913 110.991 107.302 95.417 95.800 98.442
0.300 98.557 96.509 100.089 98.583 115.535 110.364 93.351 93.839 98.440
0.400 98.525 95.944 100.356 98.520 118.720 112.963 90.977 91.796 98.341
0.500 98.720 95.488 100.472 98.292 122.703 115.684 88.979 89.837 98.381
0.600 98.875 95.088 100.588 98.093 126.470 118.290 86.994 87.857 98.404
0.700 99.090 94.687 100.710 97.918 130.104 120.830 85.018 85.848 98.469
0.800 99.173 94.214 100.820 97.741 133.552 123.313 82.974 83.763 98.435
0.900 99.310 93.750 100.946 97.571 136.644 125.802 80.964 81.657 98.440
1.000 99.304 93.276 101.053 97.403 139.135 128.231 78.867 79.461 98.343
Table 15: Welfare eﬀects of social security in the altruistic framework with temptation: θ = 1
and λ = 0.1572, and β = .959588
Ψ Y C K K/Y R
0.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 2.605 1.056
0.100 98.834 99.056 96.795 2.552 1.058
0.200 98.111 98.476 94.840 2.519 1.059
0.300 97.821 98.280 94.063 2.505 1.059
0.400 97.730 98.269 93.820 2.501 1.059
0.500 97.729 98.342 93.819 2.501 1.059
0.600 97.830 98.512 94.088 2.506 1.059
0.700 98.239 98.968 95.186 2.524 1.059
0.800 98.589 99.373 96.131 2.540 1.058
0.900 99.015 99.844 97.289 2.560 1.058
1.000 99.583 100.448 98.846 2.586 1.057
Table 16: Aggregate eﬀects of social security in the altruistic framework with temptation: θ = 1
and λ = 0.2, and β = .9616
40Ψ G1:L,L G1:L,H G1:H,L G1:H,H G2:L G2:H G3:L G3:H Average
0.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
0.100 99.294 99.017 99.979 99.284 106.142 104.017 97.606 97.881 99.316
0.200 99.343 96.871 100.023 98.864 111.470 107.533 95.415 95.875 99.065
0.300 99.582 96.998 100.114 98.597 116.245 110.696 93.399 93.959 99.188
0.400 99.837 96.683 100.231 98.376 120.635 113.635 91.419 92.033 99.286
0.500 100.060 96.305 100.350 98.121 124.721 116.444 89.421 90.070 99.353
0.600 100.222 95.765 100.465 97.902 128.592 119.139 87.403 88.063 99.364
0.700 100.435 95.376 100.607 97.754 132.420 121.794 85.476 86.061 99.435
0.800 100.491 94.889 100.714 97.582 135.961 124.402 83.432 83.959 99.382
0.900 100.516 94.354 100.813 97.389 138.970 126.978 81.341 81.787 99.298
1.000 100.518 93.757 100.924 97.174 141.406 129.504 79.236 79.557 99.190
Table 17: Welfare eﬀects of social security in the altruistic framework with temptation: θ = 1
and λ = 0.2, and β = .9616
41